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Abstract and Keywords
Every decision requires a prediction, both about what will happen and about how the de­
cider will about what happens. Thus, decisions require what is known as . This chapter 
reviews evidence that people systematically mispredict the way experiences will feel. 
First, predictions about the future are often based on memories of the past, but memories 
of the past are often inaccurate. Second, people predict that the affective quality of expe­
riences will last, thereby neglecting the widespread phenomenon of adaptation. Third, in 
anticipating an experience, people focus on aspects of their lives that will be changed by 
the experience and ignore aspects of their lives that will be unaffected. Fourth, decisions 
are profoundly affected by the choice context, even though the choice context will no 
longer be relevant when the chosen object is actually experienced. Each of these affective 
forecasting “errors” can lead people to mispredict satisfaction with decisions.
Keywords: affective forecasting, decision making, subjective experience, misprediction, rational choice
Every decision requires a prediction. The world is an uncertain place, and what may hap­
pen is rarely guaranteed to happen. Should you expand your business? Invest in stocks or 
in bonds? Refinance your home? Carry a new line of products?
As challenging as decisions like these are, there is one respect in which they are simple: 
Your aim in each of these cases is to maximize return on investment. Return on invest­
ment is the consequence that matters. It is an objective outcome that is being pursued, 
one that can be measured unambiguously. Contrast that with decisions like these: Should 
you switch jobs? Move to a new neighborhood? Go on vacation to Europe or Mexico? Eat 
at the Italian restaurant or the Japanese one? These decisions also involve predictions, 
and no doubt, they, too, have objective, unambiguously measureable characteristics. But 
now, what you are mainly trying to predict is your subjective experience. How much satis­
faction will you get from the new job? How much will you like living in the new neighbor­
hood (and how big a pain will it be to move)?
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There are certainly subjective aspects of your business decisions that matter. How will it 
feel, for example, to achieve a targeted rate of return, only to discover that a competitor 
achieved a slightly higher one? And there are certainly objective aspects of decisions 
about jobs, restaurants, and vacations that matter. So virtually all decisions, in all do­
mains, have both objective and subjective dimensions. But the questions at the heart of 
most business or other financial decisions concern predicting a future state of the world, 
whereas the questions at the heart of most of personal decisions concern future states of 
you. Personal decisions like these ask not “What will happen if I do X?” but rather “How 
will I feel if I do X?” So, in addition to predicting objective events, you must also predict 
your subjective response to those events.
This chapter is about people’s ability to predict subjective experience, what is sometimes 
referred (p. 705) to as “affective forecasting” (e.g., Gilbert, 2006; Gilbert & Wilson, 2000, 
2007). More precisely, it is about the ways in which people make frequent and systematic 
errors when endeavoring to predict how they will feel. These errors in prediction can lead 
to frequent and systematic mistakes in decision making—mistakes in the sense that the 
decisions people make often do not provide them with the subjective experiences they ex­
pect.
The potential significance of these errors cannot be overstated. The aim of rational deci­
sion making, economists tell us, is to maximize utility—not wealth, but utility. Though it is 
hard to pin down exactly what “utility” means, it certainly has a subjective element that 
cannot be eliminated. Part of deciding what job to take, where to live, where to go on va­
cation, or pretty much anything else, is predicting how your choice will make you feel. 
Even if you could predict the objective future perfectly, failure to predict the subjective 
future would consistently leave you feeling that you made a mistake. So how well do peo­
ple predict their subjective futures?
Forecasting Based on Inaccurate Memory
Imagine yourself a college student about to go off to South Florida for spring break. Some 
psychologists have outfitted you with a personal digital assistant (PDA) that will beep pe­
riodically while you are away. When it beeps, your job is to respond to a series of ques­
tions designed to assess how you are feeling at that moment. This technique is known as 
“ecological momentary assessment” (EMA; Kahneman, 1999) or “experience sampling.” 
We might regard the integral, or algebraic sum, of these moment-by-moment affective re­
sponses as an objective measure of how happy the students were to be on vacation (Kah­
neman, 1999, 2000; Kahneman & Thaler, 2006). It is a measure of “experienced utility,” or 
how life is going as it is being lived. Experienced utility is quite different from “remem­
bered utility,” which is what you rely on to answer your coworker’s query about how your 
vacation was. To answer her, you survey your memory and form a summary judgment of 
the entire vacation.
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Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, and Diener (2003) gave PDAs to college students and measured 
their moment-by-moment affective experience while they were on vacation for spring 
break. They found that the students misremembered how much fun they had had. Where­
as they remembered their vacations as having both intensely positive and intensely nega­
tive points, their moment-by-moment reports recorded on their PDAs revealed that they 
had had a much more mild time. This disparity raised a key question: If students’ in-the- 
moment ratings of spring break differed from their after-the-fact, memory-based ratings 
of spring break, which opinion would form the basis of their future decisions? What Wirtz 
et al. found was that it was the memory of the experience, not the experience itself, that 
most influenced people’s willingness to have the experience again (i.e., to go back to 
South Florida next year during spring break). Thus, it appears that when experienced 
utility and remembered utility disagree, it is remembered utility that most influences af­
fective forecasting.
Perhaps this is not so surprising. When making decisions, we draw on our experience 
with past events to decide how much we will enjoy similar future events (e.g., “How much 
did I enjoy being in Mexico last spring?”). But we cannot truly relive our old experiences 
to know how much we enjoyed them; all we have access to is our memories of those expe­
riences. Thus, every prediction requires relying upon memory, and memory is not a veridi­
cal representation of moment-by-moment experience.
If our memories were perfectly veridical, then when trying to answer a question such as 
“How was your break?” people would create a summary judgment by giving each moment 
of the experience equal weight. But Kahneman (1999, 2000) discovered that memory is 
systematically nonveridical. What Kahneman found is that two moments of an experience 
have an outsized effect on our memory-based summary judgments: the “peak” and the 
“end.” That is, what seems to be stored in memory is what the experience was like at its 
most intense point (the peak) and how it ended. Kahneman found that the global, summa­
ry evaluation of an experience (i.e., what people rely on to answer “How was your 
break?”) is not very close to people’s time-integrated moment-by-moment experiences. 
Rather, summary evaluations seem to match up with the mathematical average of the 
peak moment and the end moment.
One of the most important implications of the “peak-end rule” is that the duration of the 
experience seems not to matter, a phenomenon that has come to be known as “duration 
neglect.” Two weeks on the beach in Florida, as lived, will certainly be different from 1 
week on the beach. But if the two experiences have similar peaks and similar endings, 
they will be remembered as affectively equivalent. Indeed, Redelmeier, Katz, and Kahne­
man (2003) studied patients who underwent painful colonoscopy procedures that ranged 
in duration from 4 (p. 706) minutes to 69 minutes and found that, surprisingly, duration 
did not affect patients’ retrospective evaluations of the experience. Only the pain felt at 
the peak and at the end affected patients’ memories of the procedure and their likelihood 
of returning for a repeat procedure years later. Duration mattered so little that some pa­
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tients even preferred the longer, more painful colonoscopy procedures—as long as those 
elongated procedures ended on a less painful note.
There is now substantial evidence in support of this peak-end rule for encoding and re­
calling affect. For example, Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier (1993) 
asked participants to immerse their hands in freezing cold water twice: once in 14°C wa­
ter for 60 seconds and once in 14°C water for 60 seconds with an additional 30 seconds 
tacked on at the end, during which the water temperature was gradually raised to 15°C 
(still painful, but less so). Even though the 90-second trial exposed participants to all the 
pain of the 60-second trial and more, participants tended to remember the 90-second trial 
as less painful. When given the choice of which trial they would prefer to repeat for a 
third dunking, most participants chose the longer trial. Similar results have been found 
with other unpleasant experiences (e.g., exposing people to loud noises followed by less 
loud noises) as well as pleasant experiences.
The fact that there are discrepancies between experienced affect and remembered affect 
raises an important question: Which is more important? If a longer colonoscopy causes 
you more pain, but you remember it as causing you less, is it worth the extra few minutes 
of pain to secure a better memory? It might be, especially considering that a better mem­
ory might make you more willing to return for future colonoscopies to screen for colorec­
tal cancer. Furthermore, if you remember spring break in South Florida as a fantastic va­
cation, but your PDA reports reveal that it was rather mundane, are you better off staying 
home next year? It seems that if you decide to go back for your next spring break, and 
you have a mediocre time again, but you remember it as a wonderful trip, perhaps the 
forecasting “error” is not much of an error after all.
The experience of spring break, or ice water dunking, or anything else is just a moment in 
time. The memory of that experience may last forever. And people do not simply file away 
the memories of experiences; they “consume” those memories in the future. So there is a 
sense in which “spring break” is actually “spring break plus all the times I think about it 
and talk about it later on.” Thus, remembered affect is important beyond its function as 
the basis for future decisions; it is important because you will consume those memories 
over and over for the rest of your life.
There are a number of issues regarding the peak-end rule and its role in the encoding and 
recall of affective experience that remain to be resolved. First, what counts as an 
“episode” over which affective experience is integrated and summarized? Is spring break 
one episode or many? Does it have one peak and one end, or several? It remains to be 
seen whether global judgments are better predicted by the peak/end of each episode or 
the peak/end of the whole unified experience. Second, how are the positive and negative 
moments that characterize most real-life experiences combined and integrated? Are there 
separate positive and negative peaks? Does one get subtracted from the other? Does 
whichever peak is greater determine whether the experience is summarized as positive or 
negative? All of these questions require more investigation.
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Beyond our tendency to remember peaks and ends, there are other instances of non­
veridical memory. There is considerable evidence that people’s memories often align with 
their expectations, even if their actual experiences (as measured by ecological momen­
tary assessments) tell another story. In the 2000 presidential contest between Al Gore 
and George W. Bush, devoted Republicans and Democrats each made predictions about 
how they would feel the day after the outcome of the election was decided. Republicans 
thought they would be elated if Bush won and Democrats thought they would be devastat­
ed. But when researchers followed up with them shortly after Bush was certified as the 
winner, it became evident that both groups had overestimated their affective responses: 
Bush supporters were happy but not ecstatic, whereas Gore supporters were disappoint­
ed but not distraught. Interestingly, when researchers contacted participants 6 months 
later and asked them to recall how they had felt the day after the election’s outcome had 
been decided, Republicans remembered feeling elated and Democrats remembered feel­
ing devastated. Their recollections matched their expectations, not their actual feelings 
(Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998). Wirtz et al. (2003) found a similar 
result with the college students on vacation: They remembered spring break being about 
as much fun as they had expected it to be.
In addition, when asked to recall how they felt after events of a sort they have experi­
enced many (p. 707) times in the past, people tend to recall not a typical instance, but an 
extreme one. Furthermore, they treat the extreme instance as if it were typical. For exam­
ple, when students are asked to recall a time when their school’s team won a football 
game, they come up with the most extreme example (e.g., “We had a miraculous last-sec­
ond comeback and it was unbelievably exciting”; Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005). 
The fact that the most unusual, affectively intense examples are the ones that come most 
easily to mind means that forecasts are often based on the most extreme past experi­
ences, causing people to overpredict their emotional reactions (e.g., “I will be ecstatic if 
my team wins this time”). Morewedge et al. found that people who explicitly corrected for 
this bias in memory retrieval, either by recounting multiple past experiences to achieve a 
more representative sample on which to base forecasts or by recognizing that the salient 
example was actually an outlier, were able to forecast more accurately how exciting they 
would find the game they were about to watch. But in the absence of retrieval aids like 
these, the bias in memory retrieval toward affectively intense experiences is another 
cause of inaccurate forecasts.
Overestimating Affective Responses to Events: 
Durability Bias and Focalism
Drawing upon nonveridical memories is one reason people mispredict what will make 
them happy, but memory is hardly the only source of affective forecasting errors. Another 
important source of misprediction is a failure to appreciate that by and large, people 
adapt to new circumstances. They get over bad things and stop enjoying good things 
(e.g., Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Fredrick & Loewenstein, 1999; Gilbert, 
Affective Forecasting and Well-Being
Page 6 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 10 November 2020
2006; Lyubomirsky, 2007). Sensory adaptation and neural adaptation are long-known, 
pervasive features of the organism’s response to its environment. Stimuli of constant in­
tensity produce ever-diminishing responses over time, a process known as habituation. 
The same seems to be true of affective experience. The classic demonstration of what is 
often called “hedonic adaptation” was provided by Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 
(1978), who compared the subjective states of people who had recently become paralyzed 
and people who had won significant sums of money in state lotteries. They found that 
whereas the self-reported life satisfaction ratings of paraplegics and lottery winners were 
vastly different shortly after the momentous events, as time passed, people’s subjective 
states tended to gravitate back to their original happiness levels. Furthermore, looking at 
their projections of how happy they expected to be in the future, it was impossible to tell 
who had had a tragic accident and who had hit the jackpot. Thus, seemingly life-altering 
experiences can have merely transient effects on subjective well-being.
People do not adapt to all hedonic experience (see Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). It 
may take years to adapt to major life events like divorce, death of a spouse, or job loss, 
and adaptation may never be complete (Lucas, 2005, 2007; Lucas & Clark, 2006; Lucas, 
Clark, Geirgellis, & Diener, E., 2004; see Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008, for a review). 
Nonetheless, as a general rule, hedonic adaptation reduces the affective impact of experi­
ences over time. This fact has been codified into some theories of well-being. For exam­
ple, Lyubomirsky (2007) suggests that people have a “set point” for happiness, which may 
account for as much as 50% reported well-being. This happiness set point acts as a kind 
of gravitational pull. Good experiences deflect people up from their set points and bad ex­
periences push them down, but over time, gravity does its work and they return, at least 
partially, to where they started.
If hedonic adaptation is a fact of people’s affective lives, the question is, do people expect 
it and thus predict it? People might not spend months deciding what make and model of 
new car to buy if they know that they will only get a hedonic “kick” out of the car for a 
few weeks, after which it will become just their mode of transportation. Gilbert and Wil­
son (e.g., 2000, 2007; see Gilbert, 2006; Gilbert et al., 1998) provide extensive empirical 
evidence that people fail to anticipate adaptation. People display what Gilbert and Wilson 
call “durability bias” in expecting the affective quality of experiences to last. Gilbert and 
Wilson demonstrate this bias by asking people to predict how it will feel, days, months, 
and even years after the fact, to get tenure or be denied tenure, to have their favored gu­
bernatorial candidate win or lose an election, or to have their favored team win or lose 
the big game. They find that people’s predictions are largely unaffected by the time inter­
val between the event and the moment of evaluation. This is in marked contrast to 
queries of other people, days, months, or years after they have actually gotten or been de­
nied tenure, seen their candidates win or lose election, or their favored team win or lose 
the game. For the “experiencers” of these events, time seems to heal all wounds (or blunt 
all triumphs). The mismatch between prediction of the future and the actual (p. 708) expe­
rience of that future is a powerful example of an error in affective forecasting (Gilbert et 
al., 1998).
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In a detailed, careful investigation of adaptation, Riis, Loewenstein, Baron, Jepson, Fager­
lin, and Ubel (2005) combined the “predictor/experiencer” techniques of Gilbert et al. 
(1998) with the experience sampling techniques of Wirtz et al. (2003) and Kahneman 
(1999, 2000) in a study of patients with end-stage renal disease, a chronic medical condi­
tion. To an outsider, life as an end-stage renal patient looks pretty miserable, as multiple 
times per week, patients are required to spend several hours hooked up to a machine in a 
hospital or clinic that performs the blood-cleaning and filtering, a process known as “he­
modialysis.”
Riis et al. found healthy people to act as a control group, matching each hemodialysis pa­
tient with a healthy person who had similar demographic characteristics. The researchers 
sought to examine how healthy and sick people would imagine being in one another’s 
shoes. Hemodialysis patients were asked to imagine they had never been sick, and 
healthy people were asked to imagine they had been on hemodialysis for as long as their 
matched partner had been. The participants estimated what their mood levels would be 
like if they were in their matched partner’s shoes. Riis et al. found that healthy people 
vastly underestimated the mood levels of hemodialysis patients; they thought chronic kid­
ney disease would cause overall negative mood, whereas in actuality, hemodialysis pa­
tients’ mood levels were positive overall. Furthermore, the PDA data revealed no differ­
ences in mood between the hemodialysis patients and the healthy controls. In other 
words, the dialysis patients adapted, and the healthy controls did not anticipate this adap­
tation.
Did the dialysis patients appreciate that they had adapted? Riis et al. reasoned that if a 
patient were aware of adaptation, then when asked how happy she would be if she had 
never had kidney problems, her estimate would be about the same as the happiness she 
currently reported (which the PDA data revealed was about the same as the happiness 
that healthy controls reported): “Dialysis is bad, but I’ve adapted, so there’s no reason to 
think that if I weren’t on dialysis, I’d be any happier.” What the researchers found, howev­
er, was that dialysis patients substantially overestimated how happy they would be if they 
had never been sick. These data suggest that hedonic adaptation is a process of which 
people are largely unaware.
People not only overestimate the duration of their affective responses to events; they also 
overestimate how intense those feelings will be. This may be due to what Gilbert and Wil­
son call “focalism,” or the “focusing illusion.” When imagining an alternate state of reali­
ty, such as what it would be like to become paralyzed, people focus on the aspects of their 
lives that will be affected by that event, and ignore aspects of their lives that will be unaf­
fected. Mobility expands to fill the entire screen, and people forget that that while becom­
ing paraplegic will affect a person’s ability to get around, it might not change the quality 
of that person’s social relationships, or the satisfaction that can be derived from work. 
Many facets of life will be the same, wheelchair or not, but when imagining the momen­
tous event, all a person can think about is how his or her life will change. In addition, peo­
ple learn to adjust to the momentous event in ways that they could not have anticipated. 
They may even be able to find benefits—silver linings—in unfortunate events (e.g., “The 
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accident may have paralyzed me, but it made me appreciate how precious every moment 
of being alive is”).
To summarize this section, people experience hedonic adaptation, yet they fail to predict 
it. They also exhibit a focusing illusion, whereby they neglect to take into account all the 
ways their lives will be unaffected by the change in question. Thus, predictions of affect 
tend to be more intense and longer lasting than reality warrants due to both focalism and 
the underestimation of adaptation.
But people do not adapt to everything, and even when they do adapt, the pace of adapta­
tion can vary dramatically from one affectively relevant experience to another. We do not 
yet fully know why people adapt easily to some experiences and not to others. Indeed, 
there may be no especially perspicuous classification. Possibly, the more important to 
one’s life an experience is, the less one will adapt. Possibly, the more aspects of a 
person’s life an experience affects, the less the person will adapt. Possibly, the adaptation 
process is dynamic, such that with repeated experiences of a certain type, adaptation oc­
curs more and more rapidly. Though it is important that people be cognizant of hedonic 
adaptation so that they can predict future affect more accurately and thus be able to 
make better decisions, it is also apparent that affective adaptation is a mixed bag that we 
still do not fully understand.
Preferences Shift Depending on the Context
Another reason it is difficult to make decisions that make us happy is that our prefer­
ences are not stable. They are affected by seemingly irrelevant (p. 709) aspects of the de­
cision context, such as what other options are presented and how those options are de­
scribed. Our preferences are also affected by our state of arousal. If we fail to understand 
that our preferences change, we can exhibit a “presentism bias” (Gilbert, 2006): We 
choose what we want now instead of thinking about what we will want later.
Much of the time, perhaps most of the time, the decisions people make involve not just 
predicting how some object or event will make them feel, but how that object or event 
will make them feel in comparison with other objects and events. That is, most of the 
time, decisions require choices among alternatives. The choice one makes reflects a pre­
diction that the chosen option will make for more satisfaction than the alternatives. 
Though there is probably seldom an explicit prediction of affect (i.e., people rarely ask 
themselves, “How will I feel if I have the chicken, as opposed to the beef?”), in effect, 
making a choice among options amounts to a prediction of affect.
In theory, choice among alternatives should be fairly simple. The rational choice model of 
economists assumes that people have well-ordered preferences, so that choosing is just a 
matter of “looking up” those preferences, or of determining which of those preferences 
each option will allow you to satisfy, and then going with the highest ranked one. Econo­
mists further assume that the relation between preferences and behavior is straightfor­
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ward, so that even when people have not stated their preferences, or “looked them up,” 
we can tell what people like by observing what they choose.
Forty years of research on decision making makes it abundantly clear that this rational 
choice model provides an extremely inaccurate description of how people actually choose. 
It is not so much that people go against their preferences when choosing (though this is 
sometimes the case). It is that people may not even have preferences until a choice 
presents itself. Even more problematic, people may have partial and somewhat incoher­
ent preferences, which then get filled out by the set of options they confront. As both 
Fischoff (1991) and Slovic (1991) put it, often, preferences are constructed rather than 
consulted, and that construction is heavily influenced by the context in which choices are 
made.
For example, Brenner, Rottenstreich, and Sood (1999) asked San Francisco Bay Area stu­
dents to make choices about various travel options. One group was asked, “You are think­
ing of taking a long weekend out of town. You are considering Seattle, Las Vegas, and Los 
Angeles. How much would you pay for a roundtrip plane ticket to Seattle?” These respon­
dents were willing to pay an average of $135. The researchers then asked a second group 
of students, “You are thinking of taking a long weekend out of town. You are considering 
Seattle. How much would you pay for a roundtrip plane ticket to Seattle?” Students re­
sponding to this question were willing to pay $206 for a roundtrip ticket to Seattle, a 50% 
increase over the other group.
So which is it? Which number reflects the “true” value of a trip to Seattle? This is a ques­
tion with broad implications, since the mode of inquiry used in this study, known as “con­
tingent valuation,” has come to be viewed as the gold standard for assessing the welfare 
consequences of various public policies. Why does Seattle seem so much less attractive 
when it is considered alongside Las Vegas and Los Angeles? Brenner et al. suggest that 
when there are multiple options, people are forced to compare the benefits and draw­
backs of each locale. In making such tradeoffs, losses loom larger than gains (see, e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kahneman, 2003 for a discussion of “Prospect Theory,” which 
systematizes this sensitivity to losses). Thus, people are bothered more by what they will 
lose in passing up Los Angeles and Las Vegas than they are pleased by what they will 
gain in choosing Seattle. As Brenner et al. argue, everything suffers from comparison.
Interestingly, the presence of Las Vegas and Los Angeles as alternatives only serves to 
make tradeoffs more easily noticeable; the tradeoffs exist regardless of whether people 
realize that a choice for Seattle is a choice against going anywhere else. The people who 
were asked only about Seattle were making tradeoffs as well (i.e., by going to Seattle 
they were precluding themselves from going to Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and everywhere 
else they might go), but for these respondents, the foregone alternatives were not as no­
ticeable. It appears that people do not spontaneously generate alternatives. Comparison 
is not automatic.
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Thus, it can be said that how much one likes Seattle depends on how many options are 
presented. Preferences are shaped by the choice context. Christopher Hsee has done pio­
neering research on other misleading cues that people use to construct their preferences 
(e.g., Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Hsee, Hastie, & Chen, 2008; Hsee & Zhang, 
2004).
Consider going to choose a new set of speakers for your home theater. In the consumer 
electronics store, you listen to dozens of possibilities. Some candidates are clearly differ­
ent, but many seem (p. 710) agonizingly close in sound quality. Nonetheless, when you lis­
ten to them side by side, you can detect subtle differences.
You narrow the finalists down to two. One set of speakers sounds better than the other, 
but it is unattractive and will clash with your décor. The other, slightly less pleasing 
sounding speakers will fit into your living room perfectly. Faced with this tradeoff, which 
speakers will you choose? There is no right answer to this question, but as Hsee shows, 
there may be a substantial difference between what matters in the store and what mat­
ters at home. In choosing the speakers, you are performing what Hsee calls a “joint evalu­
ation.” That is, you are making a direct, side-by-side comparison between alternatives. 
Under these conditions, small differences in sound quality will be detectable, and proba­
bly quite salient (sound is what speakers are for, after all). Given the detectable differ­
ence, you might be tempted to choose the speakers that sound better.
But then, you bring them home, and set them up. Whereas you used joint evaluation in 
the store, at home you have separate consumption. The differences in sound that seemed 
significant in the store vanish, because you did not realize—could not realize—that it was 
only the direct comparison that made them noticeable. Meanwhile, the unattractiveness 
of your chosen speakers needs no direct comparison. It is obvious, a direct reproach to 
you for neglecting the difference the choice context makes.
For Hsee, this problem is endemic to the processes of rational choice. Wise choosers are 
supposed to comparison shop, which means using joint evaluations. But consumption is 
always separate from the foregone options. As a result, people will consistently overesti­
mate the subjective magnitude and importance of some differences. People will consis­
tently mispredict the satisfaction they will derive from their choice as a result of failing to 
appreciate that what is best in a side-by-side comparison may not be what is best alone.
A related finding was reported by Dunn, Wilson, and Gilbert (2003) in a study of first-year 
students at the University of Virginia who participated in the annual housing lottery that 
determined dorm room assignments for the next 3 years. Students entered the lottery in 
groups of their own choosing, meaning that no matter where they ended up, they would 
be with their closest friends. Thus, housing options differed from one another not in 
terms of social environment but in terms of location, and therefore convenience. Prior to 
the lottery, students believed that the outcome of the lottery would have a big impact on 
the happiness they experienced in the coming years. They were wrong: Housing had vir­
tually no impact on self-reported happiness (determined by follow-up inquiries 12 and 24 
months later). The only factor that significantly influenced happiness levels was the social 
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climate at the various houses, and because the houses differed little from one another in 
this regard, happiness levels were relatively constant. The students had focused, incor­
rectly, on location.
Why did they make this mistake? It was not because they were unaware that it would be 
social environment that would actually matter most for happiness. When asked to rate the 
significance of various aspects of residential life, students showed that they understood 
that the social dimensions of where they lived were key. Yet they abandoned this under­
standing when it came to predicting their satisfaction with the various housing options. 
These students faced a situation not unlike the customer shopping for speakers. In the 
important respects, the housing options are essentially equivalent—no matter where they 
end up, their friends will be with them, so that social environment and sense of communi­
ty were constant across alternatives. So students looked for a way to differentiate the 
housing options. They focused on the dimension—location—on which options differ, even 
though it was relatively unimportant. They then elevated the significance of this differ­
ence, forgetting that when it came to their overall happiness, any differences in location 
would be overwhelmed by the impact of their social environments.
In these examples we see that aspects of context at the moment of decision affect the 
evaluation of options, and thus affect the decision. Dunn et al.’s (2003) housing study pro­
vides another example of how affective forecasts may be inaccurate if people focus too 
much on what is the best among the options, and not enough on what will be best when it 
is experienced by itself. Thus, people who are influenced by joint evaluation to choose an 
option on the basis of features that will not matter when they are actually consuming it 
are making an affective forecasting error, even if it is only implicit.
Hot-Cold Empathy Gaps: Mispredicting the Ef­
fect of Arousal on Decisions
Preferences are unstable in another way: They often fluctuate due to changes in arousal. 
For example, when you ask people whether they would have sex without a condom, al­
most everyone says (p. 711) no. Yet lots of people do. When you ask people whether they 
would drive when impaired by alcohol, almost everyone says no. Yet lots of people do. 
This mismatch between what people say they will do when in a given state (e.g., when 
they are sexually aroused) and what they actually do is an error in affective forecasting. 
But it is different from the ones we have considered thus far. Now, the forecasting error is 
not about how people will feel in the future; it is about how the way they feel will affect 
what they do. It is what Loewenstein (1996) calls the “hot-cold empathy gap.”
Loewenstein argues that people in cold states have little empathy for themselves in hot 
states and, conversely, in hot states people do not anticipate feeling cold. People in cold 
states find their hot state behavior perplexing (e.g., “How could I have been so tired that 
I fell asleep in class?”). It is easy to imagine resisting temptation when one is not tempted 
(e.g., “I don’t need coffee before my afternoon class because there is no way I’ll be tired 
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enough to doze off”). As a result, people fail to take the kinds of precautions that will pre­
vent them from succumbing to temptation in the future. They rely too heavily on willpow­
er, because when unaroused, they do not appreciate how powerfully arousal will alter 
their preferences. When unaroused, precautions seem unnecessary.
Perhaps the first demonstration of this hot-cold effect was reported by Nisbett and 
Kanouse (1968), who showed that people who did their supermarket shopping when hun­
gry bought more food than they needed or wanted later, when they were no longer hun­
gry. They predicted their future feelings inaccurately. Another example of the hot-cold 
empathy gap is the failure of pregnant women—even women who have given birth before 
—to anticipate that they will want pain medication during childbirth (Loewenstein, 1996).
More recently, Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) showed that men who answered questions 
about the desirability of various sexual partners and practices while sexually aroused 
were considerably more willing to engage in risky sex and unorthodox sex than they were 
when unaroused. This finding demonstrates that preferences differ when people are in a 
hot state versus cold state. The forecasting error comes from the fact that people do not 
appreciate these hot/cold differences.
Loewenstein’s (1996) account of this phenomenon suggests that when people are in a hot 
state, their attentional focus narrows, the value of objects or events relevant to that state 
is enhanced, and people’s willingness to delay gratification (what is often referred to as 
their “temporal discount function”) plummets. He further suggests that people underesti­
mate the effects of being in hot states and do not remember how powerful past hot states 
were. As a result, the mistakes people make when aroused are likely to be repeated.
In discussing this phenomenon, Gilbert (2006) suggests that one reason why people fail to 
allow for the effects of hot states is that no matter how much they try to avoid it, people’s 
predictions regarding future affective states will be anchored, in part, by their current af­
fective (and neural) states. People anchored in how they feel at the moment can try to 
correct for this starting point, but correction is often insufficient, and thus people exhibit 
a “presentism bias.” As a result, current affective states will always exert an influence on 
predictions about future states.
Presentism has been demonstrated in another study that is perhaps less dramatic than 
those involving sexual arousal or intoxication, but no less compelling. Read and Loewen­
stein (1995) asked undergraduates what snacks they would like to eat during a weekly 
seminar. Some students selected their snacks every week for 3 weeks, whereas other stu­
dents were asked on the first week to choose the snacks they would eat over the next 3 
weeks. Those who chose every week tended to pick the same snack (their favorite) every 
time. But those who were asked to choose for 3 weeks at once tended to select more vari­
ety: tortilla chips this week, Oreos the next week, and Snickers bars the week after that. 
They seemed to assume that they would grow bored with the same snack week after 
week. When it came time to consume their choices, however, those who had chosen 
ahead of time often wished they could have their favorite snack again. They wanted less 
variety than they had committed themselves to, a tendency that has come to be called “di­
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versification bias” (Read & Loewenstein, 1995; Simonson, 1990). It is as though at the 
moment of choice, people imagine eating a bag of tortilla chips, then another, and then 
another, and surmise that they will get tired of eating tortilla chips. What they cannot do 
is imagine what it will be like to be offered a bag of tortilla chips a week after having con­
sumed the last one. This is a presentism bias because they are anchored on how they feel 
now (i.e., three bags of tortilla chips is too much) and do not realize that with a week in 
between each bag, their appetite for tortilla chips is quite different.
(p. 712) In a somewhat related phenomenon, when people are asked to choose several 
films to rent, all at the same time, they select something lowbrow and entertaining for 
now (e.g., Animal House) and something respectably edifying for later (e.g., The Sorrow 
and the Pity). But when “later” comes, what people turn out to want is another film in the 
lowbrow category (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2009). Similarly, people ordering gro­
ceries online are more likely to order junk food (e.g., ice cream) for now and healthy food 
(e.g., vegetables) for a few days later (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2010; see also 
Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008). As Milkman, Rogers, and Bazerman (2008) put it, 
people often face a choice between “wants” and “shoulds.” They tend to want their 
“wants” satisfied now and their “shoulds” deferred for later. But when later becomes now, 
the “shoulds” that seemed attractive enough in the temporal distance lose their attrac­
tiveness. Read and Loewenstein (1995) surmised that something similar may have been 
going on in the snacks study: People who were planning out their snacks for the next 3 
weeks had the goal of diversifying their food choices, but when it came time to eat the 
food, the goal of variety was no longer operative. All they wanted was what would taste 
the best—their favorite snack.
What all of these studies show is that people have time-inconsistent preferences. To the 
extent that people know what they want when their passions are cooled and the objects 
or events are at some temporal distance, it often makes sense for them to bind them­
selves to these preferences, because they may not still have them at the actual moment of 
choice. It is not always the case that the cool self knows best (e.g., in the throes of in­
tensely painful labor, it may make sense to abandon your cold-state preferences for a 
“natural childbirth” and do something to relieve the pain). But regardless of whether your 
judgment is better in hot or cold states, failing to recognize the extent to which arousal 
can alter preferences can produce sizable forecasting errors. Though these phenomena 
are less about predicting how one will feel about a choice in the future, and more about 
predicting how the way one feels will affect what one chooses in the future, they are 
nonetheless evidence for the importance of affective forecasting and for people’s failure 
to do that forecasting accurately.
How “Deep” Are Affective Forecasting Errors?
We have reviewed a variety of respects in which people’s predictions of future affect are 
inaccurate. We can ask, with regard to each, exactly what the nature of the inaccuracy is. 
One possibility is that people are aware of such factors as memory distortion, context ef­
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fects, and adaptation, but that they are badly calibrated. That is, they allow for these in­
accuracies, but they do not allow sufficiently for them. If so, correcting mispredictions 
would involve recalibrating a system that is already attuned to relevant factors. By analo­
gy, one could imagine someone who appreciates that the perceived size of familiar objects 
is a reliable cue to how far away they are, and thus uses perceived size as a cue to dis­
tance, but who nonetheless systematically underestimates distance. If this were the 
source of inaccuracy, adjustment would probably be fairly simple. In contrast, it is possi­
ble that people are simply unaware of any of these sources of misprediction. They cannot 
adjust, because they do not know what needs to be adjusted. This second possible source 
of misprediction would be much deeper, and much harder to correct, than a mere prob­
lem of calibration. Though there has been little systematic attention devoted to this issue, 
what evidence there is suggests that miscalibration is not the problem—that people mis­
predict affect because they simply do not appreciate context effects, adaptation, and 
memory distortion and other sources of misprediction at all (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Wilson, 2002; and Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002, for discussion).
How Leaky Rationality May Make Forecasts Ac­
curate
The foregoing discussion creates a picture of decision making that makes one wonder 
how people ever make good decisions. If decisions are aimed at maximizing utility, and 
utility includes affect, and people mispredict affect, how can they ever get it right? 
Though there is little doubt that people often do not get it right, there is another perspec­
tive on affective forecasting that suggests a mechanism by which forecasting “errors” get 
“corrected.” Keys and Schwartz (2007) wrote a paper in which they introduced a concept 
they called “leaky rationality.” What they meant by the term is that factors that influence 
a decision may continue to exert their effects after the decision is made. That is, consider­
ations at the moment of decision “leak” into the experience of the decision.
For instance, if people choose burgers that are “75% lean” over burgers that are “25% 
fat” (obviously the same burgers), they will think the “lean” burgers taste better than the 
fat ones. It seems irrational for decisions to be influenced by the way in (p. 713) which op­
tions are described (“fat” vs. “lean”). But as long as these factors that influence a deci­
sion also influence one’s experience with the results of that decision, there is nothing ir­
rational about it—at least as long as the aim of decisions is maximizing utility, a subjec­
tive entity, rather than some objective outcome.
Consider the following study by Lee, Frederick, and Ariely (2006). Patrons at a bar in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, were subjected to a taste test between a popular commercial 
beer and “M.I.T. Brew,” another commercial beer that had been adulterated with a few 
drops of balsamic vinegar. When participants were unaware of the composition of the 
M.I.T. Brew, they preferred it to the commercial beer. When they were told in advance 
that the M.I.T. Brew contained balsamic vinegar, they preferred the commercial beer. But 
when they were told about the adulteration of M.I.T. brew only after they had tasted it, 
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they preferred it to the standard beer. In their account of this finding, Lee, Frederick, and 
Ariely argue that people’s understanding before the experience (the taste) continues to 
exert its influence during the experience. So when people do not find out until after the 
fact that M.I.T. Brew has vinegar, they think something like, “What a surprise. Who would 
have thought that vinegar enhances the taste of beer?” When they find out before the 
fact, they think something like “Ugh. Beer with vinegar. This will be awful.” In other 
words, conditions of understanding under which people have an experience shape the 
subjective quality of the experience. The knowledge of M.I.T. Brew’s special ingredient 
actually alters the sensory experience of tasting the beer.
What this means is that, at least some of the time, the context of choice, with all of the 
misprediction of affect it may contain, will exert enough of an influence on the experience 
that the “misprediction” turns out not to be so wrong after all. In the study described ear­
lier in which students assigned a price to a trip to Seattle, it seems apparent that it is a 
mistake to value the trip to Seattle less when it is bracketed with trips to Las Vegas and 
to Los Angeles. But we suggest that if you spend your time in Seattle thinking about all 
you have passed up by not going to Las Vegas or Los Angeles, you will not enjoy Seattle 
nearly as much (see Schwartz, 2004). The context of the decision may leak, affecting the 
consumption of the experience. The so-called faulty forecast exerts an effect on the expe­
rience such that it is not an error.
What the concept of “leaky rationality” means is that at least some of the time, apparent 
errors of affective forecasting will not be errors. The currently unanswered question is: 
When do decisions leak? For the students in Dunn’s study, for example, the expectation 
that housing location would affect happiness did not appear to leak into the experience of 
living in the dorms. Students who got desirable dorm rooms were not more satisfied than 
those who got undesirable ones. In the example of buying speakers, it is likely that when 
people bring home the ugly speakers that sounded a little better than the attractive ones 
in the store, the context of choice will not “leak” into the experience of the choice enough 
to convince people that they made the right decision. But if the consumer can sit at home 
feeling satisfied knowing that he most certainly chose the best sounding of speakers in 
the store, he may be comforted enough to conclude that he had chosen well.
Consider another example: choosing between political candidate A, who has 5 years of ex­
perience and is extremely handsome, and political candidate B, who has 15 years of expe­
rience and is quite homely. Normally, it is very difficult to judge how many years of expe­
rience constitutes a lot of experience—is 5 years a lot or a little? In contrast, it is very 
easy to judge how attractive someone is, even without a basis of comparison. Thus, you 
might expect that if you ask people to rate one of the candidates (without knowing about 
the other candidate—a separate evaluation), candidate A would get higher ratings be­
cause his experience level is difficult to evaluate but his attractiveness is easily per­
ceived. But when the two candidates are running against one another, voters can com­
pare them and can determine that 15 years of experience is quite a lot. People given the 
choice between the two candidates (a joint evaluation) will likely choose candidate B. But 
the research on evaluability suggests that when candidate B takes office, voters are in 
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separate consumption mode—experience level is no longer perceptible and all they know 
is that the candidate who won is quite homely. Or will they remember that 15 years of ex­
perience is a lot? We submit that, in this example, features of the decision (e.g., the abili­
ty to compare years of experience) can be expected to leak into consumption. That is, 
people will remember that they chose candidate B for a reason and they will be satisfied 
with their choice, even though experience level is not normally evaluable in the absence 
of an alternative.
The scope of the effects of leaky rationality is unknown at present. What we are suggest­
ing is that to the extent that leaky rationality operates, it may (p. 714) serve to mitigate af­
fective forecasting errors. Thus, if we are interested in assessing the consequences of 
these forecasting errors for people’s judgments about the quality of their decisions, we 
must be able to specify when leaky rationality operates and when it does not. This will 
help to tell us when affective forecasting errors matter, and when they do not.
Conclusion: What Is Rational?
Even so, the literature on affective forecasting is actually quite agnostic about whether 
people’s mispredictions of the future should properly be considered “errors.” Gilbert, Wil­
son, and their various collaborators are interested in pointing out the systematic ways in 
which people mispredict future subjective experience, but they rarely discuss whether 
these mispredictions lead people astray in any way that really matters. Said another way, 
the research on inaccuracies in affective forecasting is concerned more with predicting 
what people will choose and why they choose it than it is with judging the rationality of 
people’s choices (see Gilbert, 2006, for an extended discussion of the difficulty in judging 
the rationality of decisions based on anticipated subjective experience).
In contrast, we think the literature on affective forecasting, along with the concept of 
leaky rationality, raises deep questions about what it means for a decision to be rational. 
The problem with the subjectivity that is inherent in the concept of utility is that the only 
grounds for challenging the rationality of decisions are formal ones (e.g., violations of 
consistency or transitivity). But sometimes, people will feel good about their decisions for 
bad reasons. When the aim of an experience is entirely subjective (e.g., good-tasting 
burgers and beer), there is, perhaps, no harm in people fooling themselves. But even 
here, there are objective aspects to the subjective experience. If people consistently pay 
more for “75% lean” meat than for “25% fat” meat, they can waste a lot of money. Thus, 
we challenge the notion that decisions that are objectively bad can be deemed rational as 
long as people feel good about (i.e., derive utility from) them. Happiness matters, but it is 
not the only thing that matters.
Keys and Schwartz (2007) suggest that what is needed is a richer conception of rationali­
ty that is not tied exclusively to utility—one that embeds individual decisions in lives lived 
as a whole. It is not enough to examine one decision to pay extra for 75% lean instead of 
25% fat; we must examine the consequences (e.g., wasted money) of making that type of 
decision every day for an entire lifetime. And these long-range consequences can easily 
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extend beyond the specific domain of the decision (e.g., wasting money on what you eat 
can limit the resources you have available for other sorts of things). But developing this 
richer conception of rationality is no easy task, especially at a time and in a culture in 
which people are reluctant to use any standard for assessing the quality of a life aside 
from the one adopted by the individual. The attractiveness of “utility” as a concept is that 
it avoids having to make judgments about what are better and worse decisions—better 
and worse lived lives. One can fault people for having preferences that are inconsistent, 
or intransitive. One can, perhaps, fault people for discounting the future so much that 
they are continually paying big long-term prices for small, short-term satisfactions. These 
sorts of phenomena can be labeled as mistakes and criticized. But not much else can be. 
Of course, as Lewis Carroll observed, people can use words in any way they like. But the 
honorific attached to the word “rational” is unjustified if all it means is “consistent.” For 
the word to deserve the honorific it has, it needs to refer to substantive aspects of deci­
sions, and not just formal ones.
Future Directions
The research we have reviewed on affective forecasting tells us a lot about how people 
predict their future subjective states. At the same time, it raises questions for future re­
search. Among the more significant are these:
1. When people evaluate an experience, what counts as an “episode,” over which af­
fective experience (whether moment by moment or peak-end) is integrated and sum­
marized? Is “spring break” one episode, or many? Does it have one peak and one 
end, or several?
2. How are the positive and negative moments that characterize most real-life experi­
ences combined and integrated? Are there separate positive and negative peaks? 
Does one get subtracted from the other? Does whichever peak is greater determine 
whether the experience is summarized as positive or negative?
3. In the determination of life satisfaction, how important are the actual experiences 
people have, and how important are people’s memories of the experiences?
4. Can we develop a systematic account of hedonic adaptation that explains differ­
ences across domains of experience in the time course of adaptation and its magni­
tude?
(p. 715) 5. Does experience in a particular domain affect the likelihood and magni­
tude of affective forecasting errors? That is, can people learn to prevent or counter­
act these errors? If so, what teaches them?
6. What role, in what domains, does “leaky rationality” play in mitigating the effects 
of affective forecasting errors? One can imagine that there will be cases in which 
“leakage” is substantial (“Boy, this 90% lean beef sure does taste great!”), and cases 
in which “leakage” is minimal or nonexistent. Can we find anything systematic to dis­
tinguish these two types of cases? Are there individual differences such that some 
people are much more susceptible to “leakage” than others? At present, nothing 
much is known about the leakage process except that it sometimes occurs.
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